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This study examines how competitive and cooperative relationships within
R&D consortia influence member firms’ innovation output. We propose a U-shaped
relationship between the presence of market competitors for a member firm and the firm’s
joint R&D output with other consortium members, and examine how the relationship is
mediated by interactions with other members at the firm level and moderated by
collaborative efforts at the consortium level. Using a unique sample of 320 firms from 52
R&D consortia in China, we find support for our predictions. This multi-level study
extends our understanding of competition and cooperation in multi-party networks and
provides insights for creating a balance between the two forces that is conducive to
innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
Firms in today’s fast-paced environment increasingly rely on collaborations with
competitors, suppliers, buyers, and complementors to pursue success in innovation.
In addition to bilateral arrangements, multi-party structures such as R&D consortia have proliferated due to the limited capacity of firms to innovate internally on a
sustained basis and their motivation to conduct basic research with industry peers
(Park, Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2014; Sakakibara, 2002). As R&D consortia often
include firms that are direct competitors, there inherently exists a paradox of simultaneous competition and cooperation that, while enabling resource and risk
sharing, can also incite opportunism (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Polidoro,
Ahuja, & Mitchell, 2011). This form of interaction, which encompasses a duality
of value creation and value appropriation, is known as coopetition (Brandenburger
& Nalebuff, 1996).
The phenomenon of coopetition has received increasing academic attention
in recent years (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Gnyawali & Song, 2016). One
stream of research focuses on the coexistence of cooperative and competitive
Corresponding author: Dong Chen (dong.chen@lmu.edu)
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relationships, where firms cooperate with some actors and compete with others in a
network (e.g., Afuah, 2000; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Pathak, Wu, &
Johnston, 2014). This work highlights the network context of coopetition but overlooks the cooperative and competitive interactions between individual firms (Luo,
2007). Another stream of research focuses on dyadic interactions (e.g., Bouncken,
Gast, Kraus, & Bogers, 2015; Li, Liu, & Liu, 2011; Rai, 2013; Walley, 2007; Wu,
2014; Zhang, Shu, Jiang, & Malter, 2010). However, while cooperation and competition between a pair of firms can be delineated with relative clarity, such dynamics become markedly more complicated to unpack with an increase in the number
of firms (Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994). Despite an increase in studies on multiparty alliances such as R&D consortia, which have examined their formation
(Brockhoff, Gupta, & Rotering, 1991; Hagedoorn, 1993), stability (Olk &
Young, 1997), and firm-level and industry-level impact (Branstetter &
Sakakibara, 1998; Sakakibara, 2002), few have looked at coopetition among
member firms. To understand the complex interfirm interactions embedded in
R&D consortia, more multi-level studies are needed.
While a number of studies have addressed the impact of competition and
cooperation on innovation, their findings are arguably inconclusive. While some
suggest that cooperating with direct competitors could be detrimental for innovation (Kim & Parkhe, 2009; Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2004),
others find no relationship between coopetition and performance in innovation
(Knudsen, 2007). Park et al. (2014) argue that a combination of moderate competition and high cooperation would be conducive to innovation. In contrast, Liu,
Luo, Yang, and Maksimov (2014) find that the highest level of knowledge
sharing – a prerequisite for innovation – occurs in competition-dominated relationships, whereas the lowest level takes place in cooperation-dominated relationships. Moreover, most of these studies focus on dyadic relationships. Aside from a
few case studies (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Bengtsson, Kock, LundgrenHenriksson, & Nasholm, 2016; Katz, 1986), there is sparse evidence for the
impact of competition and cooperation on innovation in multi-party contexts.
The inconsistent and incomplete findings warrant further empirical investigation.
Given the above considerations, our study aims to examine how competitive
and cooperative relationships are related to member firm innovation within R&D
consortia, using a unique sample of 320 member firms in 52 R&D consortia in
China. This work contributes to the coopetition literature in several ways. First,
it extends our knowledge of coopetition to multi-party contexts. Prior research
on competition has mainly focused on either industry-level competition (e.g.,
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, & Howitt, 2005; Gilbert, 2006) or one-on-one
competitive relationships (e.g., Chen, 1996; Park et al., 2014), both of which
cannot be readily applied to the context of R&D consortia. To examine the impact
on innovation of multiple competitors, this study focuses on how the presence
of market competitors for a member firm is related to its collaborative innovation
within a given consortium. The presence of market competitors varies across the
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consortium, as not all consortium members are competitors with one another.
Moreover, specific to the setting of R&D consortia, we examine firm-instigated collaborative interactions and consortium-level collaborative efforts, which cannot be
demarcated or otherwise jointly examined in dyadic relationships (Bouncken et al.,
2015). Thus, we respond to recent calls for investigating the multi-level linkages of
coopetition (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016).
Second, our work provides a greater articulation of the mechanisms through
which the innovation benefits of coopetition could be realized. In prior literature,
competition and cooperation are often considered as two contradictory elements in
a paradox, without a clearly specified link between the two elements (Czakon,
Mucha-Kus, & Rogalski, 2014). Indeed, because prior studies have largely
focused on the direct link between coopetition and innovative performance, we
have a limited understanding of how competition and cooperation are linked in
influencing innovation (Park et al., 2014). Furthermore, innovation performance
is often measured in terms of knowledge acquisition or innovation output by individual firms, which cannot precisely capture joint R&D outcomes (Li et al., 2011;
Wu, 2014). In this study, we address the intricate relationships among competition,
cooperation, and joint innovation in R&D consortia. We propose that the relationship between the presence of a member firm’s market competitors and its joint
R&D output is mediated by firm-instigated collaborative interactions and moderated by consortium-level collaborative efforts. To isolate the effect of competition
and cooperation on innovation within a given consortium, we focus on the output
of member firms’ joint R&D with other members.
Third, using unique data, our study offers novel empirical findings to the literature on coopetition, which is mostly comprised of conceptual papers and case
studies (c.f. Gnyawali & Song, 2016). In 2010, the Ministry of Science and
Technology of China launched a plan to facilitate multi-party collaboration on
innovation and endorsed 56 R&D consortia totaling 1,899 members, including
business enterprises, universities, research institutes, and industrial associations
(please see more details in the methods section). We were able to collect survey
data on 320 business members from 52 consortia. As a systematic effort to integrate
R&D at the national level, the ministry set specific rules and guidelines for the consortia. In addition to being required to have a leading organization and various
collaborative mechanisms (such as executive councils, expert panels, and routing
meetings), the consortia were subjected to continual government monitoring.
Akin to a quasi-experiment – in which many variables are controlled – this
setting enabled us to better identify the effects of the constructs of interest. For
instance, since only ‘industry-leading’ firms were allowed to join the R&D consortia, all competitors were presumably capable to similar degrees, and the count of
competitors became the main concern. Notwithstanding the potential lack of generalizability, this new, multi-level dataset from China may introduce important evidence on coopetition and innovation in R&D consortia and provide useful insights
for policy makers and managers working with R&D consortia. Moreover, few
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studies on R&D consortia in China exist, as prior research has mainly examined
R&D consortia in advanced economies such as the US (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995;
Ouchi & Bolton, 1988), Korea, Japan, Taiwan (Mathews, 2002; Sakakibara,
2002; Sakakibara & Cho, 2002), and Europe (Hottenrott & Lopes-Bento, 2014;
Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2004).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
To access the deeply embedded knowledge of industry peers (Hamel, 1991) and
reduce development costs and time to market (Lin, 2003), firms are known to formally establish R&D consortia (Aldrich, Bolton, Baker, & Sasaki, 1998), which are
partnerships consisting of multiple members that jointly formulate and carry out
R&D activities (Doz, Olk, & Ring, 2000; Evan & Olk, 1990; Hagedoorn &
Narula, 1996). As a basis for cooperation, member firms in an R&D consortium
need to deliberate on the sharing of costs and outputs before engaging in joint
R&D (Sakakibara & Cho, 2002). Nevertheless, due to agency and coordination
costs associated with aligning the individual goals of member firms as well as interfirm operations, it can be difficult to achieve value-added cooperation in R&D consortia (Ahuja, 2000a; Park & Ungson, 2001). A major challenge associated with
R&D consortia is the phenomenon of coopetition, or the simultaneously cooperative and competitive interactions among member firms (Luo, 2007). In this section,
we look at the relationship between competition and innovation before moving on
to examining firm-instigated collaborative interactions and consortium-level collaborative efforts.
The Presence of Market Competitors
The relationship between market competition and innovation has been extensively
studied in the economics literature (Gilbert, 2006). On the one hand, as market
competition increases, firms rely on incremental gains from innovating to beat
the competition and are thus more likely to conduct R&D to ‘escape’ the competition (Aghion, Harris, & Vickers, 1997). On the other hand, according to the
Schumpeterian model, intense competition leads to imitation that reduces the
monopoly rents of innovation; market competition may therefore discourage
R&D activities (Levin, Cohen, & Mowery, 1985). Aghion et al. (2005) suggest an
inverted-U shaped relationship, in which the escaping-competition effect dominates in industries with low levels of competition, and the Schumpeterian effect
is more pronounced in highly competitive settings. Since extant studies largely
focus on industry-level competition and firms’ individual R&D, their findings do
not necessarily apply to competitors in the same consortium and their joint
R&D activities. Indeed, a consortium does not resemble an industry setting, and
members have not only private benefits but also mutual gain to consider (Khanna,
Gulati, & Nohria, 1998).
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In management literature, findings on the impact of competition on innovation in cooperative settings are also inconsistent. On the one hand, intense competition may constrain firm innovation in the context of collaborative R&D, due to
decreasing trust and mutual commitment resulting from opportunism concerns
(Kale et al., 2000). In highly competitive settings, for instance, McAdam and
McClelland (2002) find that many firms simply copy their competitors’ ideas in
product innovation. Compared with joint R&D involving suppliers, clients, universities, and research institutes, which are known to increase innovation, collaborations with competitors have been found to exert a negative impact (Nieto &
Santamaria, 2007). Huang and Yu (2011) show also that non-competitive collaborations are more likely to enhance the performance of firms’ internal R&D activities than competitive collaborations. On the other hand, cooperation among
competitors may facilitate knowledge sharing (Ahuja, 2000b; Gnyawali, He, &
Madhavan, 2006; Polidoro et al., 2011). The proximity afforded in cooperative settings allows firms to benchmark their competitors with greater intensity and
develop a better awareness of new technological undertakings (Lomi & Larsen,
1996; Pouder & St. John, 1996). Lado, Boyd, and Hanlon (1997) suggest that competitors are able to develop non-finite, symbolic, and idiosyncratic resources (such
as altruism, trust, and reciprocity) in a cooperative network. Therefore, cooperation with competitors can be a win-win means of developing capabilities for
mutual gain if a balance of value creation and value appropriation can be achieved
(Emden, Calantone, & Droge, 2006). In addition to inconsistency in the findings,
this body of work has mainly focused on one-on-one competition in dyadic relationships, with very limited attention paid to multi-party partnerships (Bengtsson
& Raza-Ullah, 2016).
An R&D consortium may consist of businesses, universities, research institutes, and industry associations that are working on the same product or technology area. The business members may have competitive, supply, and
complementary relationships with one another. Therefore, not all members
are market competitors to a given firm. Considering the various relationships
within a consortium, this study focuses on the presence of market competitors
from a focal member firm’s perspective. In other words, we mainly examine
how individual firms view their competitive relationships within a consortium.
Meanwhile, while consortium participation may affect a member firm’s individual knowledge acquisition and follow-on innovation (Li et al., 2011; Wu, 2014),
our study only addresses its innovation output within the consortium (i.e., the
output of the member firm’s joint R&D with other members). This construct
varies across the consortium because member firms can work with different partners on different projects and thus have different output. In examining the effect
of competition on innovation within a consortium, we propose a U-shaped relationship between the presence of a firm’s market competitors in the consortium
and the innovative output the firm can bring about by working with other
members.
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A weak presence of market competitors means that most consortium members
are not a focal firm’s market competitors (i.e., the consortium does not include
many of the firm’s competitors). It does not imply low competition at the industry
level, a situation in which there is not much incentive for innovation (Aghion et al.,
2005). In fact, a weak presence of market competitors suggests the focal firm has a
unique position in the consortium. Since few other members have the same access
to the focal firm’s market, its market knowledge and experiences are relatively rare
in the consortium. Sharing similar R&D interests with the focal firm, other
members may have complementary assets from other markets and non-business
areas. To tap into the focal firm’s relatively unique market access, other
members need to build significant ties with the focal firm, conferring on the
focal firm a central, strategic position (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). According to
Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001), there are three potential benefits of being a
central actor. First, the actor would have greater access to complementary
resources from other consortium members, such as technology, know-how, and
equipment. Such resource complementarity can drive and enhance joint R&D
activities (Hagedoorn, 1993). Second, the actor has broader and earlier access to
new technology information, an advantage that can provide opportunities for
the actor to achieve timely and fruitful technology development (Zander &
Kogut, 1995). Third, the actor has higher status and bargaining power in cooperative relationships, which can be leveraged to initiate collaborations with the most
resourceful and capable partners amongst fellow consortium members. All in all,
access to superior assets and opportunities enables such strategically positioned
firms to take on more joint R&D and generate more innovation output.
Comparatively, when the presence of market competitors is moderately stronger, the focal firm has less incentive to engage in joint R&D and is less likely to
occupy a unique position in the consortium. Other consortium members can
choose to work with alternative partners (i.e., the focal firm’s competitors) that
have access to the focal firm’s market. Without significant ties to other
members, the focal firm is unlikely to obtain the information and resource benefits
attributable to occupying a central position in the consortium. Meanwhile, concerns about making competitors stronger may render the focal firm reluctant to
engage in interfirm knowledge transfers or devote critical resources to joint activities within the consortium (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). Instead, the focal
firm is incentivized ex ante towards free-riding due to its expectations of opportunism (Porter, 1998). Without active participation in joint R&D, the focal firm is less
likely to produce meaningful innovation output than in a consortium with few
market competitors.
Nevertheless, when the presence of market competitors reaches a critical level
(i.e., there is a critical mass of market competitors in the consortium), the focal firm
will face yet a different situation. The competitors, accounting for a sizable proportion of consortium participants, may give rise to a bandwagon effect that induces
the focal firm to pursue joint R&D. On the one hand, without actively
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participating in joint R&D, the focal firm risks becoming a laggard. Given a large
number of market competitors, the focal firm faces greater pressures to stay current
with technological developments. In a competitive setting, innovation leaders tend
to benefit more than the followers (Boone, 2001). If a competitor’s new technology
has reached other members first, the focal firm’s catch-up innovations are likely to
have fewer adoptions and lower returns. On the other hand, targeting the same
downstream market, the focal firm and its competitors may have similar motivations in undertaking joint R&D. As such, they may dominate other members
and guide the direction of innovation in the consortium. They may even wield
enough market power to set market-wide technology standards and be able to capitalize on the network effects (Suarez, 2005). Certainly, the drawbacks of having
multiple competitors for joint R&D still exist. As a number of members have
access to the same market, the focal firm does not have a unique strategic position
in the consortium. Further, concerns about competitors’ opportunistic behavior
remain. However, while the bandwagon effect multiplies with the presence of
market competitors, the drawbacks are unlikely to increase substantially
(Beamish & Kachra, 2004). Once the presence of market competitors reaches a
critical level, we expect the bandwagon effect to dominate the drawbacks.
Therefore, when facing a strong presence of market competitors in the consortium,
the focal firm is likely to be incentivized to actively pursue joint R&D. If not joining
the bandwagon of new technology creation and adoption, the firm may be left
behind with a gap of technology and profitability.
Given the above considerations, we argue that the way firms react to the presence of market competitors in an R&D consortium is distinct from how they
respond to competition at the industry level. Specifically, we present the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In an R&D consortium, the presence of a focal firm’s market competitors will be
related to the firm’s joint R&D output in a U-shaped relationship.

Firm Interactions with Consortium Members
The alliance and network literature have long pointed out the essential role of firminstigated interactions in collaborative relationships (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001;
Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Interfirm interactions
help firms become aware of one another’s technological capabilities, which lays
the foundation for cooperation (Ahuja, 2000b). Close interactions between firms
and between their personnel have been identified as effective means for transferring tacit, difficult-to-codify knowledge (Tushman & Katz, 1980). Such interactions
and the ensuing communications also underlie tacit troubleshooting procedures
(Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002), helping firms circumvent conflict and economize
on time otherwise spent on costly renegotiations (Uzzi, 1997). Moreover, the
rapport produced by firm-instigated interactions has been demonstrated to
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reduce behavioral uncertainty and substitute for formal governance (Arinõ &
Reuer, 2004). In particular, firm-instigated interactions have been noted as
useful in multi-party networks, where the costs of centralized organizing may
offset the synergies from collaborations (Lavie, 2006). A firm may even gain new
opportunities for innovation by reaching beyond centrally embedded members
and interacting with less embedded but potentially valuable members (Ahuja,
Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009). Therefore, a member firm’s collaborative interactions
with consortium members are expected to prompt the process of joint R&D and
enhance innovative performance.
Furthermore, we explore how competition and cooperation, both related to
innovation, are linked in R&D consortia. Prior research on coopetition usually portrays competition and cooperation as two contradictory elements in a paradox and
encourages actors to seek an optimal equilibrium (Czakon et al., 2014). With the
recognition that competition and cooperation do not necessarily conflict with one
another, coopetition has been characterized as various combinations of high and
low intensity of competition and cooperation, respectively (Bengtsson & Kock,
2000; Luo, 2005; Ritala, 2012). While acknowledging the interdependence of competition and cooperation, such an approach has yet to clearly depict tensions
between the two constructs. In this study, we demonstrate how the presence of
market competitors has a curvilinear relationship with interfirm interactions
within an R&D consortium.
Specifically, we argue that when the presence of market competitors is weak, a
focal firm tends to have relatively intense interactions with other members. As the
firm does not directly compete with most consortium members, it likely experiences less conflicts of interest and has fewer concerns regarding knowledge
leakage. Consequently, the firm may seek to interact with suppliers, buyers, and
complementors in the consortium to streamline its value creation process and
access divergent sources of knowledge (Ahuja et al., 2009). Moreover, the focal
firm’s unique position allows it to establish significant ties with others. With
limited competitors, the firm’s access to its market becomes a rare resource
within the consortium. It is likely to attract attention from other members and
enable the focal firm to establish a variety of interfirm interactions within the consortium (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
As the presence of market competitors strengthens, the focal firm not only
loses its unique position within the consortium but also encounters potential
threat from competitors. To gain access to the focal firm’s market, other
members could partner with the focal firm’s competitors. Without relatively exclusive access to its market, the focal firm’s collaborative interactions will be negatively
affected in both scope and quality. Meanwhile, in anticipation of opportunism
from competitors, the focal firm may be less willing to share resources and
exchange information (Mowery et al., 1996). Its greater intention to safeguard
proprietary assets has the potential to reduce meaningful interactions in the
consortium.
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Nonetheless, when there is a strong presence of market competitors, the focal
firm’s interactions with others may be enhanced by the bandwagon effect. To stay
current with technological developments, the focal firm needs to closely monitor
other members’ R&D activities. Through intense interactions, the focal firm can
efficiently gather information about others’ behavior and competence (Polidoro
et al., 2011), and learn early on about evolving technology and component availability (Porter, 1998). In addition, the existence of a critical mass of market competitors facilitates the establishment of R&D directions in the consortium, as well as
industry standards. Given the potential benefits from these network effects, the
focal firm is incentivized to participate in the innovation activities propagated by
critical mass rather than being left out. Therefore, the focal firm is expected to
interact more with consortium members.
In sum, we argue that member firms will respond to the presence of competitors in R&D consortia by modifying their collaborative activities, which in turn
will affect their innovation output. In other words, interactions with consortium
members mediate the relationship between the presence of a member firm’s
market competitors and its innovation output. By examining a process (firm interaction with consortium members), we attempt to unbox the ‘black box’ between a
structural feature (the presence of market competitors) and a performance outcome
(firm innovation output). Hence, we propose the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: In an R&D consortium, the presence of a focal firm’s market competitors will be
related to the firm’s collaborative interactions with consortium members in a U-shaped relationship.
Hypothesis 3: A focal firm’s collaborative interactions with consortium members will mediate the
relationship between the presence of the firm’s market competitors and its joint R&D output in
the consortium.

Consortium-Level Collaborative Efforts
In addition to firm-instigated interactions in a consortium, which reflect a bottomup process that individual members employ to manage their relationships, topdown efforts are often made at the consortium-level to enhance multi-party
collaboration endeavors (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016). Such efforts encompass
consortium-wide collaborative mechanisms, as well as the development of resources
devoted to these mechanisms (Aldrich et al., 1998).
Centralized mechanisms, such as a board of directors, a central management
office, and designated administrative personnel, are often created to oversee joint
R&D activities in the context of innovation partnerships (Hagedoorn & Hesen,
2007). Since the compartmentalization of R&D units within firms obstructs the
integration of knowledge from joint R&D (Oliver, 2004), dedicated consortiumlevel routines may be critical for firms to effectively codify and transfer the knowledge produced in R&D consortia. In a similar vein, collaborative mechanisms at
the consortium level play a critical role in retaining knowledge that might
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otherwise be lost if the members with such knowledge were to leave (Kale et al.,
2000). Given the importance of centralized collaborative mechanisms, they are
commonly adopted in R&D consortia.
In fact, in order to qualify for government endorsement, all the consortia in
our study were required to set aside funds for specific R&D projects and establish
collaborative mechanisms such as executive councils, expert panels, routine meetings, and knowledge exchange channels (Ministry of Science and Technology of
China, 2009). Although the consortia developed similar governance mechanisms,
they differed in the amount of resources dedicated to R&D collaboration.
Therefore, in this study, consortium-level efforts mainly refer to the collective
input of resources at the consortium-level.
We first posit that consortium-level efforts will strengthen the curvilinear relationship between the presence of market competitors and firm interactions with
consortium members. The availability of consortium-level resources and support
is likely to affect the magnitude of incentives for interfirm interactions. On the
one hand, if there is a lack of consortium-level efforts, the presence of market competitors will likely make no difference for the focal firm. For instance, when there
are few competitors, the focal firm has a unique position in the consortium, but any
gains from leveraging the position is limited. Even with a strong presence of market
competitors, the focal firm may not be motived to engage in joint innovation
because other members are unlikely to have meaningful collaborative R&D due
to the lack of consortium-level support. In other words, given a low level of consortium-level efforts, the focal firm expects few gains from interfirm interactions;
neither centrality benefits nor bandwagon effects are sufficient enough to incite
the focal firm to interact with other members. On the other hand, if there is a
high level of consortium-level efforts, the focal firm’s relationships with other
members will have a meaningful impact on the focal firm’s potential gains from
the consortium. The focal firm will be incentivized to actively interact with
other members to realize centrality benefits or follow the bandwagon to engage
in joint R&D. Thus, the curvilinear relationship is likely to be more pronounced.
We also expect consortium-level efforts to strengthen the relationship between
a member firm’s collaborative interactions and innovation output within a consortium. In a way, the consortium’s top-down efforts complement firms’ bottom-up
interaction processes (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016). It provides resources and
support to guide the directions of collaborative interactions and lessen the costs
of interfirm exchanges, enabling more efficient and effective joint R&D. A high
level of consortium-level efforts also raises the opportunity costs of opportunistic
behavior. Member firms are more likely to share critical resources and engage
in meaningful cooperation when the collective gain outweighs the temporary benefits from being opportunistic (Axelrod, 1984; Polidoro et al., 2011). In contrast,
without adequate consortium-level efforts in facilitating collaborations, firms’
interactions not only lack resources and support, but also face a greater threat of
opportunistic behavior from other members. Therefore, we posit the following:
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Hypothesis 4: Consortium-level collaborative efforts will positively moderate the curvilinear
relationship between the presence of a focal firm’s market competitors and its collaborative
interactions with consortium members.

Hypothesis 5: Consortium-level collaborative efforts will positively moderate the relationship
between a focal firm’s collaborative interactions with consortium members and the firm’s joint
R&D output in the consortium.

METHODS
Sample and Data
In order to study coopetition in R&D consortia, we collected data on the first batch
of 56 R&D consortia sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Technology of
China, which had announced a plan to facilitate multi-party collaborations on
innovation in 2010.[1] The plan aimed to have business enterprises and research
organizations work together on new technology creation, knowledge sharing and
transfers, product commercialization, and industrial standard development.
Prior to this plan, there had been no efforts to integrate R&D at the national
level in China, and thus no systematic data on Chinese R&D consortia. The
Ministry’s initiative allowed us to accurately identify and gain access to the
R&D consortia and their member firms. The R&D consortia in our sample
were formed between 2002 and 2010 and had existed for at least three years
when the data was collected in 2013, allowing for an adequate observation of
R&D collaborations within the consortia.
The consortia focused on specific products or technologies. Based on China’s
industrial classification code, they were divided into six industrial sectors: agriculture, forestry, and farming related manufacturing; energy sources and utilization;
chemical manufacturing, metal mining and production; machinery and equipment
manufacturing; communication and information technology (see Table 1). The
consortia each had a designated leading organization and multiple members.
The number of members in each consortium ranged from 12 to 84, with 34
being the average. In total, there were 1,899 member organizations, with 1,190
being business enterprises and the rest being universities, research institutes, and
industrial associations. While focusing on a same product or technology area,
the business members of each consortium had competing, supplying, buying,
and/or complementary relationships with one another.
To construct our sample, we first conducted semi-structured interviews with
the leading organizations. Based on information gathered from the interviews and
our literature review, we carefully designed a self-administered questionnaire to
gather firm-level data for the consortia. Given their non-profit nature and
strong affiliation with governments (Chen & Kenney, 2007), non-business
members – such as public research institutes and universities – were not included
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Table 1. List of consortia
Industrial Sector

Consortium Focus (number of members at the time of data collection)

Agriculture, forestry, and farming
related manufacturing

Tea (46), Soybean (28), Citrus (27)), Bamboo (44), Meat
(33), Milk (55), Animal feed (10), Special biological
resources (78), Livestock and poultry (20), Rapeseed (60),
Rice (85)
Natural gas (14), Coal processing (25), Biomass (33), Solar
power (57), Coal energy (14)
Fertilizer (20), Pesticide (48), Paint (16), Medical testing
materials (18), Antibiotics (16), Flu vaccine (22), Vitamin
(19), Synthetic ﬁber (44)
Mining waste processing (47), Iron and steel recycling (10),
Non-ferrous metal (14), Mineral recycling (15), Aluminum
(11), Hard alloy (23), Metal material recycling (68)
Textile machinery (36), Farming machinery (42), Numeric
control tools (17), Medical equipment (60) Light weight
vehicles (16), New energy engine (15), LED lighting (38),
Polysilicon (26), Integrated circuit package (48), Scientiﬁc
instrument (47) Navigation equipment (27), Food testing
equipment (32)
New wireless technology (61), WLAN security (84), Data
storage (25), Fiber connection (12), Open platform (73), Ecommerce technology (41), Geographic information
system (41), Aeronautical data processing (25), Open
source software (23), Intelligent grouping (18), Satellite
remote sensing system (23), Remote sensing data processing (30)

Energy sources and utilization
Chemical and pharmaceutical
manufacturing
Metal mining and production

Machinery and equipment
manufacturing

Communication and information
technology

in our survey. The questionnaire was translated and cross-checked by bilingual
researchers, and pre-tested with professional managers in China. Using member
directories obtained from the leading organizations, we sent the questionnaire to
the liaison persons of the 1,190 business members in charge of consortium collaboration via email. After two rounds of follow-up reminders, we received 320 valid
responses from 52 consortia. The number of responses from each consortium
ranged from 4 to 12, yielding an average response rate of 26.89%. To check for
non-response bias, we examined the age and the number of employees of the business members and found no significant differences between the respondents and
non-respondents. Given the inclusion of both consortium-level and memberlevel data, our final sample represents a unique source of information for a
multi-level study on coopetition in R&D consortia.

Variables
This study focuses on how the presence of market competitors affects member
firms’ innovation in R&D consortia. Innovation output is commonly measured
with patenting activity in prior literature (e.g., Ahuja, 2000a; Kim & Inkpen,
2005; Vakili, 2016). A rise in the number of patents reflects an increase in a
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firm’s innovativeness (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994). In this study, we measured a member firm’s joint R&D output in a consortium with the number of
patents a firm had produced by working with other members. All of the consortia
in our study stated that they had established mechanisms for member firms to
jointly create new patents. In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to
specify the number of patents they had produced by working with other consortium members in the preceding three years.[2] The number varied not only
across consortia but also between firms within a same consortium, as the firms
did not necessarily participate in all the joint R&D projects of a given consortium.
To measure a firm’s collaborative interactions with other consortium
members, we calculated the weighted intensity of the firm’s collaborative activities.
Due to the implicit nature of interfirm interactions, firms often hold different perceptions and are subject to different degrees of influence. Perception-based indicators can therefore provide a broader view of interfirm relationships (Venkatraman
& Ramanujam, 1986). In the survey, we asked each firm to evaluate its cooperative
interactions with other consortium members during the preceding three years. On
five-point Likert scales with 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest value, respondents
rated the importance and intensity of the following items: joint technology development, joint new product development, commissioned R&D within the consortium, joint R&D sourcing from outside the consortium, setting technical and
product standards, exchanging technological information, sharing R&D facilities
and equipment, joint exploration of international markets, joint procurement,
joint marketing, joint training, and joint pursuit of government support. An
importance-weighted average of those collaborative activities was then calculated
to capture the extent of a firm’s collaborative interactions with others in a given
consortium.
The main independent variable, the presence of market competitors, was measured
with the proportion of a member firm’s market competitors among its fellow consortium members. Market competitors are firms offering similar products in similar
markets (Chen, 1996). Because a consortium would not typically include all market
competitors and those included by default have collaborative relationships with
one another, competition within a consortium is likely not equivalent to competition at the industry level. Competition indicators in the economics literature, such
as the Herfindahl Index based on market share and concentration (Boone, 2008;
Kwoka, 1985) and the Lerner Index based on average price cost margin across
firms (Aghion et al., 2005), usually apply to the whole industry and cannot
reflect the nuanced relationships among consortium members. A number of strategic management scholars have used the count of competitors to indicate market
competition, considering both product and market similarity (Ang, 2008; Ritala,
2012). Following this approach, we counted the number of members that are considered the market competitors of a focal firm in each consortium, which allowed us
to capture the presence of market competitors from an individual firm’s perspective.
To identify competitive relationships, we first consulted industry experts to assess if
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each unique pair of member firms in a same consortium offer similar products in
similar markets. If so, they were considered market competitors to each other.
Then we verified the assessments with the leading organization of each consortium.
In the case of discrepancies, we contacted the member firms in question and used
their own opinions. To account for differences in the size of the consortia, we
divided the number of a firm’s market competitors by the total number of consortium members excluding the focal firm. For a few consortia, the size and composition of firms changed slightly in the three-year period preceding our data
collection. In such cases, the three-year averages of consortium members and
each firm’s market competitors were used in our analysis.
The moderating variable, consortium-level collaborative efforts, was calculated by dividing the consortium-level R&D expenditure in the preceding three
years by the number of consortium members. As all of the consortia in our
study had similar governance mechanisms, they differed in how much effort
they actually put into R&D collaborations. We had asked the leading organizations
to evaluate consortium-level collaborative efforts in the interviews, but their selfevaluations appeared to be subject to social desirability bias because of government
monitoring (Fisher & Katz, 2008). Therefore, we decided to adopt the value of collective funding for R&D expenditure as a proxy for consortium-level collaborative
efforts. To account for the varying sizes of the consortia, we divided the total consortium-level R&D expenditure in the preceding three years (in millions of RMB)
by the number of consortium members and calculated the logarithm of the averaged R&D expenditure for our analysis.
Several control variables were included in our analysis. At the firm level, we
controlled for firm size, R&D intensity, years in the consortium, ownership attribute, and distance to the leading organization. Previous literature on innovation
has suggested that firm size tends to affect innovation activities (CamisónZornoza, Lapiedra-Alcamí, Segarra-Ciprés, & Boronat-Navarro, 2004). In this
study, firm size was measured using the logarithm of a firm’s average annual
sales (in millions of RMB) in the preceding three years. R&D intensity, measured
with the ratio of a firm’s R&D expenses to its total sales, is also considered a main
determinant of innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). To delineate a firm’s R&D
efforts, we separated expenses spent on joint R&D within a consortium (i.e., collaborative R&D with consortium members) and those spent on non-consortium R&D
(i.e., R&D conducted independent of the consortium – by the focal firm itself or
with non-members). Using corresponding numbers reported by the survey respondents, we calculated the intensity of within-consortium R&D and the intensity of
non-consortium R&D in the preceding three years. Since innovation usually
takes time, we also controlled for the number of years for which a firm had
been a member of a given consortium. As the existence of state-owned or controlled enterprises is a typical feature of the Chinese economy, we measured ownership attribute with a dummy, where state-owned or controlled firms were coded
1 and otherwise 0. Moreover, considering that geographic distance affects
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coordination and knowledge distribution in R&D collaboration (Boschma, 2005),
we controlled for a member firm’s geographic distance from its corresponding
leading organization, which played a central role in consortium formation and
operation. Using their headquarters’ locations, we measured the geographic distance in kilometers, and took its logarithm after adding one to the distance
(because the distance could be zero). At the consortium level, we controlled for consortium size, as indicated by the total number of members in a consortium; and the
percentage of non-business members, which might exhibit different behavioral patterns from business members in R&D collaboration (Agrawal, 2001). We used
dummy variables to control for the industries represented by the consortia.
Analysis
This research examines the collaboration and innovation of individual firms nested
within R&D consortia. To account for both firm-level and consortium-level
factors, we employed multi-level modeling to examine the hypothesized relationships (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). This approach facilitates an accurate examination
of how explanatory variables at multiple levels contribute to the outcome of interest (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007), allowing us to investigate our
research questions that entail constructs from both the firm and consortium
levels. Specifically, since the measure of innovation output is a count variable,
we used negative-binomial multi-level analysis. The negative binomial distribution
can accommodate overdispersion in count data, and thus may fit better than the
Poisson distribution (Hox, 2010). Firm-level collaborative interactions, measured
with a weighted composite index, was treated as a scale variable. In order to
obtain unbiased estimation, multi-level analysis requires a sufficient sample size.
Our final sample contains 52 consortia, which is greater than 30, the general
rule-of-thumb requirement at the group level. While some consortia in our
sample contain a limited number of members, research on multi-level modeling
suggests that the group-level sample size is more important than the total sample
size, and that an above-50 sample size at the group level is sufficient to generate
accurate coefficient estimates (Mass & Hox, 2005; Snijders, 2005).
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. The standardized values
of the explanatory variables – except for the dummies – were used in our analysis.
Standardization helps to reduce multicollinearity in multi-level modeling, especially when estimating quadratic and moderating relationships (Kreft, De
Leeuw, & Aiken, 1995). This approach is also in line with multi-level analysis,
which usually focuses on the sign of a relationship rather than on a specific coefficient (Pike & Rocconi, 2012). To check for potential multicollinearity, we calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all the predictive variables as well as
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Variables
Mean
Standard deviation
1. The number of patents produced by joint R&D in the
consortium
2. Firm interaction with consortium members
3. The proportion of market
competitors
4. Averaged consortium-level
R&D expenditure
5. Firm size
6. Years in the consortium
7. The intensity of non-consortium
R&D
8. The intensity of withinconsortium R&D
9. State ownership
10. Distance to the leading
organization
11. The number of consortium
members
12. The percentage of nonbusiness members
13. Self-evaluation of innovative
performance

1

2

3

4

5

6

13.800
59.358

3.461
0.976

0.300
0.282

2.034
1.843

6.224
2.639

4.010
1.630

7
0.053
0.043

8
0.009
0.016

9

10

0.486
0.501

5.483
2.210

1
0.003

1

11
35.230
20.592

12

13

0.402 4.062
0.176 0.718

1

0.069

1

0.174* −0.034

1

0.081

0.006

0.116

0.166* 0.134*
0.147
0.106
−0.085 −0.075
−0.028

0 .061

−0.030
0.011
−0.101 −0.047
0.007

0.063

−0.124 −0.138*
0.049

0.642***

0.049
−0.046
−0.101
0.078

1
0.079
1
0.338*** 0.364*** 1
0.144* −0.463*** −0.062
0.112

−0.277** 0.043
0.069 −0.026
0.041

0.000

−0.245** −0.074
0.222*
0.169*
−0.128

−0.215** −0.403*** −0.114
0.019
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations

0.155*

0.073

0.109
−0.035
−0.020

1
0.117

1

0.040 −0.085
−0.078 −0.022
0.101

0.093 −0.158* −0.054

1

−0.209** −0.110 −0.085 −0.031 −0.067 −0.265***
−0.021

−0.072

Notes: N = 320; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; industry dummies are not reported here for space consideration.

0.028 −0.136* −0.142*

0.066

1
−0.074 1
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the quadratic and interaction terms of interest. The VIF values ranged from 1.049
to 2.501, below the commonly used threshold of 4, suggesting that multicollinearity
was not a concern.
To examine the number of patents produced by working with other members,
we first estimated a null model with intercepts only. The null model showed significant random effect variance at 2.683 (standard error 1.254, p < .05), suggesting
significant between-consortium differences and the need for multi-level modeling.
Then we added firm-level and consortium-level predictors. The results are shown
in Table 3. Model 1 is a base model without the squared term of the proportion of
market competitors; Model 2 includes the squared term. As Chi-square statistics in
Table 3 reflect differences in deviance compared to the null model, a significant
increase of the Chi-square value suggests that Model 2 fits the data better than
Model 1. While the proportion of market competitors only shows a marginal
effect in Model 1,[3] both its linear and squared terms are significant and positive
in Model 2. Specifically, the coefficient of the squared term indicates an exponential effect size of 1.883 (with a 95% confidence interval from 1.094 to 3.241), suggesting that the outcome mean is 1.883 times larger when the predictor is one
standard deviation from its mean. Moreover, half of the negative ratio of the
linear term to the quadratic term (-0.458/2 × 0.633 =−0.362), which indicates
the vertex (turning point) of a quadratic curve, falls in the range of the standardized
proportion of market competitors. To validate the curvilinear relationship, we
employed a method recommended by Simonsohn (2018) to estimate two separate
lines (i.e., monotonic decreases and increases at the two ends of the curve). A breakpoint for the standardized value of the proportion of market competitors was found
at 0.299.[4] Using the base model, two separate analyses were conducted on two
sub-samples separated by the breakpoint. For the subsample with lower values
(no more than 0.299), the coefficient of the proportion of market competitors
was −1.028 (standard error 0.518, p < 0.05). For the subsample with higher
values (greater than 0.299), the coefficient was 2.649 (standard error 1.169, p <
0.05). Two opposite and significant relationships were observed. These results
suggest that there is a U-shaped relationship between the presence of a firm’s
market competitors and the firm’s innovation output in an R&D consortium.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported.
Similarly, for firm interactions with consortium members, a null model
without predictors showed a significant random effect at 0.133 (standard error
0.063, p < .05), supporting the use of multi-level modeling. Models with explanatory variables are presented in Table 4. While the proportion of market competitors is insignificant in Model 1, its squared term is significant and positive in
Model 2. Adding the squared term improved model fit, as suggested by the
increase of Chi-square. Following Peugh’s (2010) method, we obtained the global
effect size of Model 2 (pseudo-R2 = 0.138) and the local effect size of the squared
term (the proportion reduction of variance = 0.023). Given the relatively small
global effect, the effect of the squared term can be considered meaningful (Cohen,
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The number of patents produced by joint R&D in the consortium
Variables
Intercept
Firm size
Years in the consortium
The intensity of non-consortium R&D
The intensity of within-consortium R&D
State ownership
Distance to the leading organization
The number of consortium members
The percentage of non-business members
Averaged consortium-level R&D expenditure
The proportion of market competitors
(The proportion of market competitors)2
Firm interactions with consortium members
(Firm interactions with consortium members) x
(Averaged consortium-level R&D expenditure)
Negative Binomial
Chi-Square

Model 1

Model 2

0.929 (0.646)
0.760 (0.846)
0.663* (0.252) 0.816** (0.283)
0.316 (0.206)
0.393† (0.231)
−0.486* (0.200) −0.511* (0.212)
−0.347 (0.274) −0.335 (0.278)
0.177 (0.455)
0.289 (0.455)
−0.482* (0.203) −0.570* (0.226)
−0.470† (0.250) −0.450 (0.352)
−0.494 (0.261) −0.386 (0.379)
0.214 (0.244)
0.257 (0.345)
0.528† (0.304)
0.458* (0.231)
0.633* (0.274)

3.248
250.580***

3.138
276.397***

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

0.617 (0.863) −0.526 (0.802)
0.640 (0.738)
0.140 (0.716)
0.394 (0.297)
0.388 (0.266)
0.422 (0.285)
0.408 (0.276)
0.404† (0.235)
0.356† (0.214)
0.323 (0.238)
0.272 (0.230)
−0.654** (0.221) −0.412† (0.212) −0.590** (0.219) −0.498* (0.218)
−0.293 (0.291) −0.381 (0.312)
−0.311 (0.302) −0.408 (0.323)
0.122 (0.488)
0.611 (0.463)
0.210 (0.467)
0.213 (0.479)
−0.533* (0.229) −0.378† (0.209) −0.459* (0.230) −0.377† (0.222)
−0.338 (0.359) −0.489† (0.282)
−0.349 (0.338) −0.397 (0.304)
−0.305 (0.388) −0.255 (0.305)
−0.387 (0.351) −0.432 (0.316)
0.131 (0.356) −0.348 (0.313)
0.137 (0.341) −0.154 (0.340)
0.335 (0.321)
0.387 (0.295)
0.213 (0.349)
0.464 (0.319)
0.684** (0.227) 0.671** (0.231)
0.637** (0.232) 0.649** (0.234)
0.581** (0.222)
0.487* (0.217)
3.082
285.366***

2.977
259.217***

3.152
290.287***

3.079
296.131***

Notes: N = 320. †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Industry dummies were included in the analysis but are not reported here for space considerations. Chi-Square values were calculated in comparison to the null model. In negative binomial multilevel models, residue effect variance was set to 1.

D. Chen et al.

© 2019 The International Association for Chinese Management Research

Table 3. Negative binomial multilevel modelling of innovation performance

Competition and Collaboration in R&D Consortia

163

Table 4. Multilevel modelling of firm interactions
Firm interactions with consortium members
Variables

Model 1

Intercept
Firm size
Years in the consortium
The intensity of non-consortium R&D
The intensity of within-consortium R&D
State ownership
Distance to the leading organization
The number of consortium members
The percentage of non-business members
Averaged consortium-level R&D
expenditure
The proportion of market competitors
(The proportion of market competitors)2
(The proportion of market competitors) x
(Averaged consortium-level R&D
expenditure)
(The proportion of market competitors)2 x
(Averaged consortium-level R&D
expenditure)

3.515*** (0.246)
0.085 (0.091)
0.063 (0.077)
−0.013 (0.079)
0.050 (0.090)
−0.007 (0.172)
−0.035 (0.068)
0.069 (0.075)
−0.056 (0.083)
0.116 (0.082)

Residue effect variance
Random effect variance
Chi-Square

0.905*** (0.099)
0.028 (0.058))
300.389***

−0.003 (0.081)

Model 2

Model 3

3.137*** (0.270) 3.112*** (0.271)
0.141 (0.090)
0.151 (0.092)
0.052 (0.075)
0.037 (0.076)
−0.007 (0.078)
−0.022 (0.079)
0.052 (0.089)
0.051 (0.090)
−0.015 (0.168)
−0.017 (0.170)
−0.050 (0.066)
−0.037 (0.066)
0.007 (0.073)
0.002 (0.072)
0.043 (0.084)
0.071 (0.087)
0.106 (0.077)
0.120 (0.077)
−0.180* (0.083)
0.315** (0.099)

−0.177† (0.106)
0.352** (0.102)
−0.110 (0.096)
0.024 (0.089)

0.885*** (0.088) 0.885*** (0.088)
0.023 (0.056)
0.020 (0.054)
307.289***
298.124***

Notes: N = 320. †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Industry dummies
were included in the analysis but are not reported here for space considerations. Chi-Square values were calculated in comparison to the null model.

1988). The vertex of the quadratic curve (0.180/2 × 0.315 = 0.286) is within the
predictor’s value range, suggesting a U-shaped relationship between the presence
of a firm’s market competitors and the firm’s collaborative interactions with consortium members. To validate this relationship, we conducted a two-lines test,
using the base model and two subsamples (Simonsohn, 2018). A breakpoint to separate the subsamples was found at 0.194 for the standardized value of the proportion of market competitors. For the subsample with lower values, the coefficient of
the proportion of market competitors was -0.539 (standard error 0.259, p < 0.05).
For the subsample with higher values, the coefficient was 0.456 (standard error
0.225, p < 0.05). As such, Hypothesis 2 was supported.
Hypothesis 3 predicted a mediating relationship, in which firm interactions
with consortium members mediate the relationship between the presence of
market competitors and firm innovation output in a consortium. Following the
guidelines laid out by MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets
(2002), we examined the mediating relationship. First, the level of firm interactions
with consortium members is related to the proportion of market competitors in a
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curvilinear fashion. Second, it is correlated with the logarithm of the patent count
(Pearson correlation 0.223, p < 0.001). Third, the patent count and the proportion
of market competitors are no longer related when firm interactions with consortium members is controlled for. As shown in Model 3 of Table 3, the term of
firm interactions with consortium members is significant and positive, and the
linear and squared terms of the proportion of market competitors become insignificant. Specifically, the term of firm interactions with consortium members has an
exponential effect size of 1.982 (with a 95% confidence interval from 1.250 to
3.096), suggesting the outcome mean is 1.982 times larger when the predictor is
one standard deviation above its mean. The Chi-square value of Model 3 also suggests a better model fit in comparison to Model 2. Fourth, the indirect effect (i.e.,
the amount of mediation) is significant. A Sobel test showed a Z-score of 2.188 (p <
0.05), supporting the mediating relationship. Since the Sobel test is very conservative and has limited power (MacKinnon et al., 2002), we also used the Monte Carlo
method for mediation assessment (Hayes, 2013; MacKinnon, Lockwood, &
Williams, 2004). The method generated a 95% confidence interval of the indirect
effect between 0.048 and 0.442. Since the confidence interval excluded zero, the
existence of mediation was confirmed. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported.
Figure 1 summarizes the relationship in a path diagram.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 were concerned with the moderating effects of consortium-level collective efforts. As shown in Model 3 in Table 4, the interaction
terms of the presence of market competitors and average consortium-level R&D
expenditure do not show significant effects on firm interactions with other
members, suggesting individual member firms’ reaction to the presence of
market competitors is unlikely to be changed by consortium-level efforts.
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was not supported by the data. A possible explanation
is that all the R&D consortia in our study had adequate R&D funding because
the Ministry of Science and Technology of China had considered funding as a prerequisite for government endorsement. As long as there was adequate R&D
funding, firm interactions in response to the presence of market competitors
would generally follow the hypothesized curvilinear relationship. If there were
situations in which consortia lacked consortium-level funding in the data, the moderating effect might have been significant.
On the other hand, Model 4 in Table 3 shows a significant moderation term,
suggesting that the averaged consortium-level R&D expenditure positively

Figure 1. The mediating relationship
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moderates the relationship between a firm’s interactions with consortium members
and its count of patents produced within the consortium. The moderation term has
an exponential effect size of 1.788 (with a 95% confidence interval from 1.158 to
2.768). To further examine the moderating relationship, we divided the sample
firms into two groups along the mean of average consortium-level R&D expenditure and tested the effect of firm interactions with consortium members in each
group. In the subsample with above-mean R&D expenditure, the coefficient of
firm interactions with consortium members was 1.199 (standard error 0.355, p
< 0.001), indicating an exponential effect size of 3.317 (95% confidence interval
from 1.680 to 6.681). In the subsample with below-mean R&D expenditure, the
coefficient was 0.274 (standard error 0.228) and insignificant. The results suggest
that firm interactions with consortium members will help produce more patents
only when there is a high level of consortium-level efforts. Meanwhile, considering
that the effect of within-consortium competitors is mediated by firm interactions
with consortium members, the proportion of market competitors may be dropped
to improve model fit. Those two reduced models (Model 5 and Model 6) in Table 3
show greater Chi-square values. In particular, Model 6 indicates that adding the
moderation term improves model fit (as compared to Model 5) and has a significant exponential effect size (=1.627, 95% confidence interval from 1.036 to
2.487). The results confirm that consortium-level efforts tend to enhance the positive impact of a firm’s interactions with consortium members on its patent count.
Such findings are consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 5.
In addition, our control variables showed various relationships with innovation
output. While the intensity of within-consortium R&D was insignificant, the intensity
of non-consortium R&D was negatively linked to the number of patents produced
via joint R&D. This suggests that, although spending more on collaborative projects
does not necessarily increase joint R&D output, spending more on non-consortium
projects is likely to hurt joint R&D output. It is plausible that member firms tend to
pay more attention to their own projects than to collaborative projects with consortium members. Interestingly, the distance between a member firm and the consortium leader is negatively related to the firm’s joint R&D output. This finding
shows that, despite advances in communication technology, geographic distance
still matters in multi-party R&D collaboration. Moreover, firm size lost its significance after the term of firm interactions with consortium members was added to
the analysis, suggesting a possible relationship between the two variables. Since
the linear term is insignificant (see Table 4), this relationship may be curvilinear.
The number of years in a consortium did not show a significant effect. This is probably because the majority of the member firms joined their respective consortia when
the consortia were founded, and thus lacked within-consortium differences in terms
of time length. State ownership and the percentage of non-business members were
also insignificant. Since those R&D consortia were sponsored and monitored by government agencies, member organizations, state-owned or private, business or notbusiness, were expected to conform to certain common rules and behavioral
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patterns. Lastly, the number of consortium members did not show meaningful direct
effects either. While small consortia may not have adequate knowledge exchanges
and industry-wide impact, large consortia are likely to suffer from information overload and managerial difficulties. There probably exists a curvilinear relationship
between consortium size and innovation output.
In order to check the robustness of the above results, we allowed the firm-level
variables to have random slopes in alternative multi-level models (Snijders, 2005).
These models did not significantly improve model fit, and the results were similar
to our findings on the hypothesized relationships. Moreover, we considered an
alternative, subjective measure of innovation performance. While some scholars
showed there was no major systematic disparity among patent counts, patent citations and new product announcements when measuring innovation performance
(Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003), others were concerned that the number of patents
might not fully account for the quality of innovation (Narin, Noma, & Perry,
1987). To address this concern, we asked the respondents to evaluate how much
the consortium had helped them produce new products and technology, increase
innovation capability, and improve the competitiveness of their products or services on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest. The
average rating was calculated as an alternative measure of innovation performance
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.910). The results of multi-level analysis using this measure
are shown in Table 5. As shown in Model 2, the squared term of the proportion
of market competitors helps improve model fit and has a positive relationship
with the self-evaluation of innovation performance. After adding firm interaction
with consortium members in Model 3, the squared term becomes insignificant,
suggesting a mediating relationship. These results are consistent with our findings
obtained for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Different from our prediction in Hypothesis 5,
average consortium-level R&D expenditure does not seem to have a moderating
effect (see Model 4 and Model 6); instead, it shows a marginal relationship with
self-evaluated innovation performance. Certainly, such a marginal relationship
does not provide adequate support for a positive direct effect. A possible explanation is that firms may use R&D input as an indicator of innovation performance
(Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003). Assuming greater input leads to greater output, firms
may have positive feelings towards the consortium’s R&D efforts. However, such
efforts may not yield actual patents if individual firms fail to actively interact
with other members on R&D collaboration.

DISCUSSION
This study offers new insights into the interplay of competition and cooperation.
The results highlight the intricate nature of coopetition by demonstrating a curvilinear relationship between the presence of a member firm’s market competitors
and its innovation output in an R&D consortium. Our findings also provide
© 2019 The International Association for Chinese Management Research

Table 5. Examining an alternative measure of innovation performance

Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

3.943*** (0.173) 3.671*** (0.192) 3.820*** (0.156) 3.818*** (0.157) 3.923*** (0.137) 3.922*** (0.138)
0.077 (0.065)
0.119† (0.064)
0.050 (0.052)
0.051 (0.053)
0.034 (0.051)
0.035 (0.052)
−0.070 (0.057)
−0.083 (0.055) −0.080† (0.045) −0.080† (0.045) −0.077† (0.044) −0.077† (0.044)
0.002 (0.055)
0.002 (0.054)
0.008 (0.044)
0.008 (0.044)
0.007 (0.044)
0.006 (0.044)
−0.008 (0.059)
−0.006 (0.058)
−0.034 (0.043)
−0.032 (0.043)
−0.033 (0.043)
−0.032 (0.042)
−0.067 (0.120)
−0.066 (0.118)
−0.036 (0.096)
−0.037 (0.096)
−0.037 (0.095)
−0.038 (0.096)
−0.097* (0.049) −0.106* (0.048) −0.071† (0.038) −0.071† (0.039) −0.066† (0.038) −0.066† (0.039)
−0.025 (0.060)
−0.015 (0.057)
−0.008 (0.045)
−0.007 (0.045)
0.007 (0.044)
0.008 (0.044)
0.025 (0.060)
0.032 (0.067)
0.041 (0.052)
0.041 (0.053)
0.012 (0.048)
0.012 (0.048)
0.159* (0.066)
0.150* (0.062)
0.090† (0.047)
0.087† (0.050)
0.090† (0.049)
0.087† (0.051)
−0.028 (0.061) −0.145* (0.071)
−0.038 (0.058)
−0.038 (0.058)
0.227** (0.073)
0.086 (0.060)
0.087 (0.060)
0.455*** (0.044) 0.454*** (0.045) 0.469*** (0.043) 0.468*** (0.043)
0.010 (0.040)
0.008 (0.040)

Residue effect variance
Random effect variance
Chi-Square

0.415*** (0.046)
0.051 (0.035)
169.798***

0.408*** (0.045)
0.034 (0.031)
175.644***

0.274*** (0.031)
0.015 (0.020)
255.791***

0.275*** (0.031) 0.273*** (0.030)
0.015 (0.020)
0.016 (0.020)
251.263***
261.763***

0.275*** (0.031)
0.016 (0.020)
257.211***

Notes: N = 320. †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Industry dummies were included in the analysis but are not reported here for space considerations. Chi-Square values were calculated in comparison to the null model.
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Intercept
Firm size
Years in the consortium
The intensity of non-consortium R&D
The intensity of within-consortium R&D
State ownership
Distance to the leading organization
The number of consortium members
The percentage of non-business members
Averaged consortium-level R&D expenditure
The proportion of market competitors
(The proportion of market competitors)2
Firm interactions with consortium members
(Firm interactions with consortium members) x
(Averaged consortium-level R&D expenditure)
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empirical evidence for the mediating effect of firm-instigated interactions and the
moderating effect of consortium-level efforts.
Specifically, the U-shaped relationship between the presence of market competitors and joint R&D output suggest that having few market competitors provides the focal firm with a unique strategic position, while a strong presence of
competitors creates a bandwagon effect, both of which would enhance joint
R&D. This curvilinear relationship helps reconcile the conflicting findings in the
extant literature. On the one hand, when the presence of competitors is relatively
weak, the results are consistent with arguments that diversity in consortium
members promotes participation in joint R&D (Okamuro, 2007), and collaborations with suppliers, clients, universities, and research institutes are more likely
to increase innovation output than collaborations with competitors (Nieto &
Santamaria, 2007). On the other hand, when the presence of competitors is relatively strong, the benefits of working with competitors, such as gaining knowledge
(Gnyawali et al., 2006), awareness of technology development (Lomi & Larsen,
1996), and relational capital (Lado et al., 1997), become more pronounced. For
a given member firm, a moderate presence of market competitors is not ideal.
Neither does it offer the focal firm a unique strategic position, nor enough benefits
from working with competitors to outweigh the threat of opportunism.
It should be noted that, while significant relationships have been observed in
our data, the effect size of our model is relatively small (Cohen, 1988). This is not
surprising because much of the variance in firm innovation output can be attributed
to organizational mechanisms and individual level factors (Volberda, Foss, & Lyles,
2010), whereas our study focuses on more observable firm- and consortium-level
variables. As Lewin, Massini, and Peeters (2011) have noted, innovation output
depends on external routines like knowledge identification, learning, and transferring as well as internal routines like facilitating variation, managing selection and
adaptive tensions, sharing knowledge, reflecting and updating. Such intricate processes of learning and innovation cannot be fully captured by R&D spending, a
commonly used proxy for firms’ absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
Nevertheless, while our data did not portray what took place inside the firms, the
findings help us better understand how they tend to react to the structural features
of R&D consortia. Given our focus on competition and cooperation in R&D consortia, our model can be deemed as reasonably meaningful (Cohen, 1988).
Overall, our findings shed some light on the nuanced relationships within a
R&D consortium. In prior work on coopetition, the intensities of competition
and cooperation are often given and could have various high-low combinations
(Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Czakon et al., 2014). Our results show that the
presence of a firm’s market competitors has, in fact, a curvilinear relationship
with its collaborative interactions. The findings support the existence of a low
competition-high cooperation combination and a high competition-high cooperation combination in R&D consortia (Luo, 2007). Moreover, our results reveal
the mechanisms through which competition affects innovation output in R&D
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consortia. Member firms react to the presence of market competitors by adjusting
their interactions with others, which, in turn, affects joint R&D output. Also,
consortium-level efforts can strengthen the impact of interfirm interaction on
innovation output. The results highlight the differential roles of firm-instigated
interactions and consortium-level efforts in attenuating the influence of coopetition
on innovation. This insight has not been forthcoming in the alliance literature,
which primarily focuses on dyadic relationships, in which collaborative mechanisms at the firm level cannot be meaningfully separated from those at the alliance
level (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Polidoro et al., 2011). By focusing on coopetition dynamics in R&D consortia, our study disentangles efforts by firms to
manage collaborative activities from those at the consortium level.
Furthermore, this study answers calls by several recent papers for empirical
research on coopetition in distinct contexts (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Gnyawali &
Song, 2016; Park et al., 2014). Our research represents a novel effort to empirically
examine the impact of competition and coopetition on innovation in the context of
R&D consortia in China. Firms rarely report formal quantitative data on their collaborative activities in public statements, and performance outcomes specific to
interfirm collaborations are often confounded with those from internal operations
(Lavie, 2007). To overcome such empirical challenges, we compiled a unique
dataset using information gathered from interviews, surveys, and archives. More
importantly, we employed multi-level analysis to examine cross-level relationships
using data at both the firm and consortium levels of analysis. In doing so, our
article is able to shed light on when and how innovation output can be generated
through consortium collaboration.
In addition, our analysis outlines the boundary conditions for the innovation
impact of competition and cooperation in R&D consortia, thus offering useful
insights for policy makers and managers working with large multi-party collaborations. Specifically, member firms need to pay close attention to their market competitors, the presence of which has a curvilinear impact on collaborative
interactions and joint R&D output. When there is a weak presence of competitors,
member firms can leverage their exclusive market access to elicit more collaborations within a consortium and generate more innovation output. When there is a
strong presence of competitors, member firms benefit from joining the bandwagon
to stay on top of technology developments. In addition, governments and leading
organizations that oversee R&D consortia need to carefully consider the composition of members, which may significantly influence joint R&D output. They also
need to recognize the importance of consortium-level efforts, which may enhance
the effectiveness of interfirm interactions in R&D consortia.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
The limitations of this study should be acknowledged. First of all, some measures
could be further refined. Assuming only capable firms were allowed to join the
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consortia, we used the proportion of market competitors to indicate competition
within a consortium. The alliance literature suggests that partners with different
characteristics may have different behavioral patterns (Ahuja, 2000a), which
affect their relationships and performance (Li et al., 2011). It is possible competition within a consortium is subject to differences among competitors. Also, consortium-level effort was measured with a proxy of averaged consortium-level R&D
expenditure. Although this proxy reflects centralized R&D input, it may not
fully account for other types of collective efforts, such as patent pools (Lampe &
Moser, 2016) and relational governance (Bouncken, Clauß, & Fredrich, 2016).
Future studies could explore alternative measures for these variables.
Moreover, while both the structural and strategic aspects of R&D consortia
evolve over time, we were only able to obtain cross-sectional data. Since we examined R&D collaboration during a three-year period, our ability to infer strong
causal linkages for the relationship between coopetition and innovation is
limited. In addition, although this study is a rare empirical study on multi-party
alliances, it is necessary to consider the generalizability of our results. For instance,
the organizing principles in R&D consortia are different from those found in other
settings involving interfirm collaboration, such as alliances bound by production,
marketing and distribution agreements. Also, our findings in China may not
hold in other emerging market or advanced economies and should be interpreted
carefully with the context in consideration.
Future research can work towards including other variables that may have an
impact on the innovation performance outcome examined in our article. For
instance, prior research suggests that coopetition in alliances could also be influenced by the network position of member firms (Ahuja, 2000a; Gnyawali et al.,
2006), and the extent to which the firms are able to establish trust (Lado et al.,
1997). In order to shape the competitive environment in a favorable way, ﬁrms
tend to cooperate in the early stages (with greater common interests) of the
value chain and then compete (with higher conﬂicting interests) in product
markets (Sanchez, 2008). The inclusion of pertinent variables that capture these
factors may help to further explain the impact of competition and cooperation
on innovation. Moreover, government involvement in these consortia may affect
the interplay of competition and cooperation therein. All the consortia in our
study were endorsed and supported by the government, with government agencies
involved in various ways, such as direct funding, tax credits, low-interest loans and
subsidies, at the firm, project, and consortium levels. Because of practical constraints, we were not able to directly measure such government involvement.
Future research in devising innovative measures to quantify government involvement in R&D consortia may be valuable.
Lastly, while our study focuses on the output of joint R&D within consortia,
future research may explore other aspects of innovative performance, such as knowledge acquisition, patent citations, and new product announcements (Hagedoorn &
Cloodt, 2003; Li et al., 2011). Since most patents were newly produced and many
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R&D projects focused on basic research and process innovation, we did not have
meaningful data on patent citations and new product announcements. In an
extended study, we investigated the relationship between the presence of a
member firm’s market competitors and its knowledge acquisition, measured with
the number of other members’ patents the focal firm had accessed in the preceding
three years. Neither linear nor curvilinear relationships were found, suggesting that
the mechanisms underlying knowledge acquisition may be different from those that
facilitate joint R&D. As suggested by Lee, Park, and Bae (2017) in a recent study,
licensing-in others’ technology does not always enhance follow-up innovation.
While our main study focused on joint R&D output, this extended study examined
member firms’ private gain from consortium participation (Khanna, Gulati, &
Nohria, 1998). More research is needed to understand the relative role of private
gains and common benefits in R&D consortia.
NOTES
We are thankful for the comments from the editors and reviewers, and we also thank Michael
S. Cheng for his research assistance. This research was supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (Grant No. 71272019 & 71872100).
[1] The Ministry identified two more batches of consortia in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Since we
lacked information on these additional batches of consortia at the time of data collection, and
many of them were not established long enough to have developed meaningful collaborations,
these consortia were not included in this study.
[2] Given our research focus, we examined individual member firms’ innovation output within a
consortium. It should be noted that the member firms could produce patents outside of the consortium, working on their own or collaborating with non-members. The respondents were clearly
instructed to separate the patents produced in the consortium from those produced outside of the
consortium. Certainly, it is possible that firms may apply learning from consortium collaboration
to their own innovation, which is beyond the scope of this study.
[3] Given the recent debate on statistical significance (Benjamin et al., 2018), we acknowledge that
such a marginal relationship lacks statistical significance. In this article, marginal relationships are
reported for informational purposes and are not considered as meaningful findings.
[4] In the two-lines test, the breakpoint is set to maximize statistical power rather than fit
(Simonsohn, 2018).
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